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Abstract 
Individuals and societies have interacted with people with dementia in different ways for as 
long as the condition has existed.  Sometimes this has involved support; sometimes 
exploitation; and sometimes something in between.  What sets the contemporary context 
apart is that, since the coming into force of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2008, supported decision-making has assumed a formal 
legal dimension, one which has been adopted in different ways across different jurisdictions.  
This article explores forms of supported decision-making through a dementia-centred lens, 
looking at the benefits of supported decision-making in dementia but also identifying 
conceptual and practical challenges.  It argues that for people with dementia, the availability 
of supported decision-making offers a legal choice; a way of maintaining some degree of 
control for as long as possible.  However, the specific challenges need to be appreciated. 
The article compares two legislative frameworks: the Representation Agreement Act 2000 in 
British Columbia and the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 in Ireland, both of 
which show the complexities involved in developing legislation in this arena.  
1. Introduction 
O you kind gods/ Cure this great breach in his abusèd nature/ 
Th' untuned and jarring senses, O, wind up/ Of this child-changèd father! (Cordelia, King 
Lear, Act IV, Scene VII) 
Whether or not, as some have argued, King Lear suffered from Lewy Body Dementia, the 
play still provides a powerful illustration of both the possibilities and limits of supported 
decision-making in dementia.  Cordelia represents an ideal of how supported decision-
making can work; as Lear describes (as he and Cordelia are taken away to prison) ‘so we’ll 
live/And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh/At gilded butterflies’ (Act V, Scene III).  
Goneril and Regan represent the dangers; mendacious and self-serving, they trick their 
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father into handing over power and then abandon him as his needs grow: ‘old fools are 
babes again’ (Goneril, Act I, Scene III).  
 As King Lear reminds us, humans have interacted with their loved ones with 
dementia in different ways for as long as the condition has existed.  Sometimes this has 
involved support; sometimes exploitation; and sometimes something in between.  What 
sets the contemporary context apart is that, since the coming into force of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2008, supported 
decision-making has assumed a formal legal dimension.  Under the CRPD, ratifying States 
are required to ‘take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to 
the support they require in exercising their legal capacity’ (Art. 12(3)).  As a direct result of 
this requirement, several States (including India, Ireland, and several Australian 
jurisdictions) have reformed their domestic legal frameworks to incorporate elements of 
supported decision-making.  
Although disability NGOs played a central role in the negotiation of the CRPD 
(Dhanda, 2006-7; Kayess and French, 2012; Arstein-Kerslake, 2017), organisations 
representing people with dementia were not involved.  Thus, the particular context of 
dementia did not receive attention.  Yet, the kind of legal frameworks for supported 
decision-making which States adopt are of central importance to people with dementia and 
those who care for them. This article looks at supported decision-making from a dementia-
centred perspective.  Its core argument is that translating supported decision-making ideals 
into law is a complex process.  Nonetheless, finding ways to maximise supported decision-
making should be at the heart of law and policy development for dementia care. 
The article begins by exploring the conceptual and human rights underpinnings for 
legal frameworks for supported decision-making.  It then adopts a dementia-centred lens, 
looking at the benefits of supported decision-making in dementia but also identifying 
conceptual and practical challenges.  The article then compares two legislative frameworks: 
the Representation Agreement Act 2000 in British Columbia and the Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Act 2015 in Ireland, both of which show the complexities involved in 
attempting to develop legislation in this area.  
2. Supported Decision-Making: Conceptual and Human Rights Underpinnings  
In evaluating the possibilities and limits of supported decision-making in dementia, it is 
useful begin by considering how this concept has evolved to a point where it represents a 
powerful alternative to traditional approaches centred on an ‘objective’ assessment of the 
best interests of people with dementia (Donnelly, 2010: 177-181).  
2.1 Conceptual Antecedents 
The conceptual antecedents for current discourse on supported decision-making  
derives from several sources.  One is the social model of disability, which emerged first in 
(physical) disability studies in the 1970s.  Among other aspects, this approach advances the 
distinction between impairment (a person’s underlying condition) and the person’s disability 
(the way in which the person’s impairment has been socially constructed) (Abberley, 1987; 
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Oliver, 1990, 2009).  In this way, this approach draws attention to the ways in which societal 
actions can reduce or remove the impact of disability.   
A second antecedent is the critiques of individualist liberalism which began to 
emerge, initially from feminist scholarship in the 1980s (Baier, 1985, 1995; Kittay, 1999).  
Just as individualist autonomy was enjoying its normative heyday (Veatch, 1981; Engelhardt, 
1986), feminist scholars began to question its underpinning presumptions.  Of particular 
relevance was the challenge to the ‘antecedently individuated’ liberal subject (Sandel, 1997: 
62).  From these critiques, there have emerged constructions of the ‘socially embedded’ 
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000: 4) and interdependent, relational subject (Kittay, 1999).   This 
approach offered valuable new ways of thinking about conundrums in respect of female 
agency.  It showed that agency could be enhanced or diminished depending on social 
context.  Individuals are not simply autonomous or not autonomous; rather as Jennifer 
Nedelsky envisioned, one becomes autonomous or, as she frames it ‘able to find and live in 
accordance with one’s own law’ (1989: 10).  What is key for present purposes is the 
recognition that the development (or suppression) of autonomy always happens in the 
context of relationships with others. 
.  
These arguments had significant traction, primarily because they are self-evidently in 
line with experience.  It is indisputable that society plays a significant role in constructing 
impairment as disability and that societal structures can reduce the extent to which people 
with capacity impairments experience disability.   It is also uncontentious that the vast 
majority of people operate within relational networks and draw on others when making 
decisions (Gilbar, 2011).  No great act of imagination is required to appreciate the role of 
these networks in enabling people with impaired capacity to develop autonomy skills.  Thus, 
it would seem reasonably safe to say that there is an overlapping consensus that supporting 
people with impaired capacity to live more autonomous lives is both a good thing and a 
possibility (Series, 2016).  Beyond this, matters become more contentious.  The binary 
opposition between impairment and disability, which the social model posits, is disputed, as 
is the ‘hard’ social constructionist model (Shakespeare, 2006, 2013; Terzi, 2004).  Thus, as 
we move more towards the edges eg. situations of profound capacity impairment or 
situations involving complex relationships, there is much less consensus on the deliverability 
of supported decision-making (Series, 2016).   
2.2 Incorporation into Human Rights Norms 
As more developed understandings of supported decision-making were beginning to 
emerge (and before empirical evaluation of operation in practice had developed), the 
concept of supported decision-making came to assume centre stage in human rights 
discourse around impaired capacity.  This was because of its inclusion as a key aspect of 
delivering on the equal right to legal capacity set out in Art. 12(2) of the CRPD.  As noted 
above, Art. 12(3) expressly requires States Parties to provide support to persons with 
disabilities so that they can exercise their legal capacity. No further direct elucidation 
regarding what constitutes support is included in Art. 12(3).  However, Art. 12(4) requires 
States Parties to ensure that ‘all measures which relate to the exercise of legal capacity 
provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law’.  Such safeguards must ensure that ‘measures relating to 
the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person’.  
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There is an element of deliberate ambiguity regarding the meaning of the equal right 
to legal capacity in Art. 12 (Dhanda, 2006-7).  Although it is clearly stated that decision-
making support must be provided, there is no direct indication regarding the status of legal 
frameworks for substitute decision-making (i.e.  legal frameworks which allow (some) 
decisions to be taken on behalf of a person with impaired capacity).  In its first General 
Comment, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the body charged with 
monitoring implementation of the CRPD) rejected all capacity-based distinctions as 
discriminatory and inconsistent with the equal right to legal capacity (GC No 1, 2014, para 
15).   It also rejected any basis for decision-making other than the will and preferences of 
the individual or, where ‘after significant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to 
determine the will and preferences of an individual’, the ‘best interpretation of will and 
preferences’ (para 21).  Of most direct relevance to the discussion here is GC No. 1’s 
interpretation that compliance with Art. 12 requires that all substitute decision-making 
regimes should be abolished and replaced with supported decision-making frameworks 
(para 28).  In the view of the Committee, this should be immediately realized (i.e put in 
place without delay) (para 30).  GC No. 1, as clarified by a subsequent Corrigendum (2018), 
provides a description of (prohibited) ‘substitute decision-making regimes’ (para 27).  
However, it offers little positive guidance regarding how States should develop their laws to 
provide for supported decision-making. 
GC No. 1 was contentious (Gooding, 2015; Quinn,2016) with critics advancing a 
variety of normative objections to the down-playing of protective norms (Ward, 2014; 
Dawson, 2015; Freeman et al, 2015; Essex Autonomy Project; Donnelly, 2016).  For the 
discussion in this article, the most significant concern with GC No. 1 is the lack of an 
evidence base regarding the feasibility of supported decision-making.  Ratifying States are 
advised that compliance requires them to take a step into the unknown, in situations which 
involve some of the most vulnerable members of their societies.  Given this, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that no ratifying State has, in fact, introduced measures to abolish substitute 
decision-making and that a significant number of States (Australia; Canada; Egypt; Estonia; 
Georgia; Ireland; the Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Singapore; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Venezuela) have ratified the CRPD subject to interpretative declarations/reservations in 
respect of Art. 12.  These generally assert the ratifying State’s view that Art. 12 permits 
substitute decision-making in some cases.   
The resistance to the Committee’s vision in GC No. 1 does not in any way reduce the 
normative attractions of supported decision-making as a significant part of any legal 
framework for impaired capacity. It does however focus attention on the need to develop a 
convincing evidence base, developed with reference to the different lived realities of people 
with impaired capacity.  It is in this context that the specifics of dementia are now explored. 
   
3. The Dementia Challenge 
Every person’s experience of dementia is unique.  However, there are some common 
features of life with dementia which have normative significance in developing legal 
frameworks for supported decision-making.   
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3.1 Living with Dementia  
Dementia is not a single condition but rather a ‘clinical state where a decline in cognitive 
function, such as loss of memory, judgement, language, complex motor skills and other 
intellectual functions, leads to a decline in independent daily function’ (Ash, 2014: 3).  This 
decline may progress rapidly or slowly.  In most (though by no means all) cases, the decline 
will involve a person whose capacity was previously unimpaired.  This sets dementia apart 
from other capacity impairments in that the progressive nature of dementia means that  
increased impairment is highly likely.   
A second relevant feature is that, while dementia is not just a condition of old age, 
age is the strongest predictor of dementia (Doron, 2014).  This has several implications. 
First, people with dementia may have other health problems and may be moving to the 
later stages of their lives.  Thus, end-of-life issues play an important role in dementia care.  
Secondly, many people with dementia will have lived full and active lives in which they have 
developed moral, political, social, religious and other views; built a complex set of 
relationships; and, acquired financial and other assets.   
 3.2 Support in Dementia 
In setting out a ‘new paradigm’ for supported decision-making, Michael Bach and Lana 
Kerzner identify six different kinds of decision-making supports (2010: 74-82).  These are: 
life planning (choosing priorities in the context of values); independent advocacy (helping 
the person express his or her will and preferences); communicational and interpretative 
supports (representing the person’s often unique forms of communication); 
representational supports (representing the person’s will and preferences on the basis of 
long-standing relationships and/or shared life experiences); relationship building supports 
(assisting the person in building personal support relationships); and, administrative 
supports (completing formal and procedural requirements).   Although Bach and Kerzner 
were concerned with people with intellectual/developmental disabilities, many of these 
supports could also operate effectively for people with dementia.  Thus, an adaptation of 
this paradigm could provide part of a framework for supported decision-making in 
dementia.  This approach could enhance the quality of life and maximise the autonomy and 
dignity of people with dementia; it could help to ensure that, despite dementia, the person 
remains a player in his or her own life. 
 However, Bach and Kerzner’s paradigm cannot address all the support needs of 
people with dementia.  At least two issues arise.  First, as Bach and Kerzner acknowledge, 
the ‘fundamentally different lived experience’ of ‘older adults’ leads to enhanced concerns 
about abuse and neglect.  Therefore, older adults tend to afford greater importance to high 
levels of review and oversight (2010: 37).  It would be dangerously short-sighted to assume 
that concerns about abuse and neglect are only an issue for older adults. Nonetheless, the 
range and complexity of life experiences of a person with dementia means that there is a 
heightened risk of abuse and neglect.  These is borne out by the statistics on elder abuse, 
which indicate that 15.7% of people aged over 60 have experienced abuse of some form 
(Yon et al, 2017).  The challenge for any legal framework is to find a way to balance 
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empowerment and protective concerns in a way which is maximally appropriate for all the 
people to whom it applies. 
 A second issue relates to the norms which underpin the support provided.  The 
fundamental normative question is the relationship between a person’s past and present 
will and preferences.  This question first came to attention in the context of advance 
directives.  In a well-known contribution, Ronald Dworkin used the example of Margo, a 54 
year-old woman with Alzheimer’s Disease to argue that an advance directive made while a 
person has capacity should take priority over her subsequent wishes and interests if she has 
lost capacity (1993: 220).  In advancing this argument, Dworkin contrasted two kinds of 
interests which a person might have: critical interests, which concern value judgements and 
the kind of life a person wants to lead; and, experiential interests, which are concerned with 
quality of life issues, such as freedom from pain, contentment and pleasure.  Dworkin 
argued that critical interests are protected by the principle of autonomy in a way that 
experiential interests are not.  Accordingly, he advocated that the decisions of a person with 
capacity regarding her critical interests should be prioritised over her current experiential 
interests.  
Whether or not one agrees with Dworkin in respect of advance directives (and his 
argument in this context has been criticised on normative grounds (Dresser, 1995)), the case 
for respecting a person’s prior interests is clearly stronger where the person has set these 
down in a formal instruction, such as an advance healthcare directive.  In cases of supported 
decision-making in dementia, a person’s prior underlying values may be far less clear.  
Nonetheless, Dworkin’s argument still resonates in this context.  The issue is usefully 
illustrated by Herring with the following example: Bertha has dementia and has started to 
visit a mosque, which involves crossing a busy road.  Although it is not clear how much she 
understands, Bertha derives great pleasure from the visits and when stopped she becomes 
agitated and distressed.  Bertha’s family are concerned because Bertha had been a 
vehement atheist all her life and is now putting herself in danger by crossing the road to get 
to the mosque (2009: 7).   For the discussion here, the question which this scenario poses is 
which norms should underpin Bertha’s support: the maintenance of her previous atheism 
(which in this scenario coincides with greater physical safety) or her current engagement 
(which coincides with greater physical risk)?   
As has been pointed out, a difficulty with Dworkin’s approach is that it presumes 
that ‘our critical interests are turned into stone once we lose certain cognitive abilities’ 
(Lindemann Nelson, 2010: 228).  However, identifying this weakness does not make the task 
of selecting the underpinning norms for support frameworks any easier.  In fact, the blurring 
of the neat boundary upon which Dworkin relied raises even more challenges.   In 
attempting to address these challenges, Bruce Jennings rejects both the ‘hard’ pre-
incapacity conception and the simple post-incapacity hedonic conception.   He argues 
instead in favour of an agency model under which dementia care is seen as a ‘hermeneutic 
process, a form of interpretative practice’ (2010: 171).  Dementia care should be a ‘form of 
reminding’ (2010: 172); it should both recall to mind what has been forgotten in the course 
of the illness and also ‘re-mind’ in the ‘more radical sense of reconstructing the subject, the 
person’ (2010: 172).  This view seeks to place the ‘dynamic, dialogic, or relational aspects of 
mind and agency’ at the heart of dementia care (2010: 172).   
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Jennings uses the concept of ‘memorial personhood’ to describe this goal (2010: 
176).  Memorial personhood ‘derives from three components of the individual’s ontological 
situation: need, vulnerability, and the duty called forth by remembered identify’ (2010: 
176).    This approach rejects simple past/present distinctions and seeks new ways to 
identify underpinning norms.  Thus, supported decision-making is not about supporting a 
person to make the decisions s/he would have made prior to dementia; nor is it about a 
simple hedonic response post dementia. Somehow, decision-making supports have to 
combine both the person’s past and their present; to recognise the ‘moral work done by 
memory and imagination’ (Jennings, 2010: 177) yet simultaneously to respond to the person 
as a moral subject in his or her current state.  While this sounds complex, it probably 
represents what many supporters of people with dementia actually do in practice; they seek 
to balance past and present preferences and to help the person they support to reach 
decisions which best represent both their past and present selves. In this way, they ‘hold’ 
the person in their identity, while at the same time adjusting to the changes brought about 
by dementia (Lindemann, 2010).  
 None of this requires a legal framework in order to happen.  Yet, legal frameworks 
are still important, especially when it comes to interactions with the world outside the 




4. Delivering Supported Decision-Making: Legal Frameworks  
The translation of the normative complexity identified above into legal frameworks is by no 
means straightforward.  Normative choices always come at a cost.  More relaxed legal 
frameworks make supported decision-making more accessible for people with impaired 
capacity but they may also leave a potentially vulnerable person at greater risk of abuse.  
More stringent legal frameworks may reduce the possibility of abuse but they also reduce 
the accessibility of support and are invasive in the private and family/relational lives of the 
person and his or her supporters.   In this context, it is also worth noting that we lack 
empirical evidence regarding the link between stringent legal frameworks and reduced 
instances of abuse.  We may have an instinct that stringent legal frameworks reduce abuse 
but we cannot say definitively that more people are abused when the framework is relaxed 
and fewer when it is stringent.  
 
4.1 The Representation Agreement Act 2000 
The Representation Agreement Act 2000 (RAA) was the first Canadian legislation to 
establish a comprehensive framework for supported decision-making.  The RAA is best 
understood within the broader Canadian context and so the discussion here begins by 
placing the RAA in this context.   
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4.1.1. The Canadian Context 
The earliest legislative recognition of supported decision-making in Canada is found in the 
Quebec Civil Code from 1866 (Gordon, 2000).  However, in the early 2000s, a new wave of 
legislation began to emerge.  This was largely in response to the concerns of families and 
carers of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities and from health and social 
care professionals working with these people (Nunnelly,2015).  From these concerns 
emerged the community living movement and the family-based advocacy movement, the 
Canadian Association for Community Living (CACL) (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 33).  This 
movement, among other initiatives, developed the concept of personal support networks 
for people with intellectual/developmental disabilities.  These encompass a range of options 
including circles of friends; support circles; Microboards; Arora entities; and self-directed 
support corporations (Nunnelly, 2015: 16)).  These networks endeavour to support a person 
with intellectual disabilities so as to enable him or her to live independently.  
 In the 1990s, the CACL launched a task force for legislative reform, including the 
development of alternatives to guardianship (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 33).  This led to the 
introduction of legislation in a number of western Canadian states/territories.  The RAA in 
British Columbia was followed by the Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Act 2001 
in Saskatchewan; the Adult Protection and Guardianship Act 2003 in the Yukon and the 
Adult Guardianship and Trustee Act 2008 in Alberta.  With the exception of Alberta, all the 
initiatives precede the CRPD. In all cases, the legislation falls short of complying with the 
CRPD (as interpreted in GC No 1) in that supported decision-making frameworks operate 
alongside, rather than replace, frameworks for substitute decision-making.  Beyond this, 
there are differences in scope and delivery, which in turn reflect different normative 
approaches.  In broad terms, British Columbia and the Yukon adopt a more relaxed legal 
framework, thus favouring accessibility while the frameworks in Saskatchewan and Alberta 
tend to be more stringent, thus favouring protection (James and Watts, 2014). 
 The RAA was ‘hailed by the disability community as highly successful legislative 
recognition of supported decision-making’ (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 53). Because the CACL 
was a member the International Disability Caucus, which played a crucial negotiating role in 
the agreement of the CRPD, the RAA model was important in convincing negotiating states 
of the possibility of legislating for supported decision-making.  However, the picture of the 
RAA is rather more complex than is sometimes presented.  The legislation was contentious 
from the outset (Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies, 2006).  It was criticised by lawyers 
for its vague drafting (Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies, 2006: 7; James and Watts, 
2014: 17) and also by senior rights advocates for failing to address the needs and concerns 
of older adults (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 37).   It would seem however that, post CRPD, 
criticisms have ‘quieted down’ and that the ‘more fluid and modern understandings of 
capacity and social vulnerability [in the RAA] would raise far fewer eyebrows in 2014 than 
they did in the early 1990s’ (James and Watts,2014: 17). The next section will identify the 
core elements of the RAA before turning to look at the (limited) empirical data on the 




4.1.2. The RAA: The Core Provisions  
The RAA provides that any adult (there is no link to disability) can make a representation 
agreement (RA) unless s/he is incapable of doing so (RAA, s. 4).  Under the RA, the adult may 
appoint one or more representatives who may be assigned different areas of authority or 
may be jointly appointed in the same areas of authority (RAA, s. 5).  The powers, scope and 
method of appointment of a representative depend on the nature of the decisions to which 
the RA applies.  Two different forms of RA are provided for.  The first is an RA containing 
‘standard provisions’ (RAA, s. 7).  These are decisions about: the adult’s personal care; 
routine management of financial affairs; most healthcare; and obtaining legal services (RAA, 
s. 7(1)) as well as authority to accept admission to a care facility, provided that the care 
facility is a family care home; a group home for the mentally handicapped; or, a mental 
health boarding home (RAA, s. 7(2)).  For these decisions, an adult may authorise the 
representative to help the adult make a decision or to make decisions on behalf of the adult 
(RAA, s. 7(1)).   Thus, the RAA permits full substitute decision-making (albeit that the 
substitute is chosen by the person with impaired capacity).  
 The most contentious element of the RAA relates to the legal process around the 
completion of an RA with standard provisions.  The RAA provides that an adult may 
complete this kind of RA even though s/he lacks the capacity to contract; manage his or her 
healthcare/personal care or legal matters or the routine management of his/her financial 
affairs (RAA, s. 8(1)).  Instead, in determining if a person is incapable of making this kind of 
RA, all relevant factors must be considered, including whether the person communicates a 
desire to have the representative help make/ make/stop making decisions; whether the 
person demonstrates choices and preferences and can express feelings of approval or 
disapproval; whether the person is aware that making/changing/revoking the agreement 
will change the authority of the representative; and, whether the person has a relationship 
with the representative that is characterized by trust (RAA, s. 8(2)).  
The standard of capacity is higher for a ‘non-standard’ RA. This is an RA where the adult 
authorises his or her representative to do anything the representative considers necessary 
in relation to the personal care or healthcare of the adult or to make decisions about where 
the adult is to live and with whom; the adult’s participation in employment, educational, 
social, vocational or other activity; contact and association; application for a licence or 
permit; day-to-day decisions, including about dress and diet; giving and refusing healthcare; 
and, physical restraint despite the objections of the adult (RAA, s. 9(1)).  For an RA covering 
these decisions, the test for ‘incapability’ is that the adult in ‘incapable of understanding the 
nature and consequences of the proposed agreement’ (RAA, s. 10).  
The other contentious aspect of the RAA is that the contract is private and subject to 
limited external scrutiny. There are some formal requirements (i.e. the RA must be made in 
writing and must be witnessed (RAA, s. 13)) but there is no requirement for legal advice.   It 
is possible for a third party to make an objection to the Public Guardian and Trustee in 
respect of an RA on the basis that the adult was incapable of making the RA or that fraud, 
undue influence or some other form of abuse or neglect had been used in making, changing 
or revoking the RA (RAA, s. 30(1)). Beyond this, a degree of protection is provided by  the 
requirement that the adult must include in the RA the name of a person to act as a monitor 
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(RAA, s. 12(1)).  The Monitor must make ‘reasonable efforts’ to determine if the 
representative is complying with his or her legislative obligations (RAA, s. 20(1)).  In brief, 
these are to act honestly, in good faith and with care, skill and diligence of a reasonable 
person; and, within the authority given by the RA (RAA, s.16(1)).  In pursuance of his or her 
obligations, the Monitor may require the representative to produce accounts and records in 
respect of his or her activities (RAA, s. 16(8)) and may visit and speak with the adult at any 
reasonable time (RAA, s. 20(2)).  
4.1.3 Application in Dementia  
From the relatively brief review of the RAA above, it is easy to see why it is celebrated by 
disability rights activists from a community living perspective.  The RAA makes supported 
decision-making accessible for many people with an intellectual or developmental disability 
with a minimum of legal formality.  Within functional families/relationships (i.e. where the 
there is no possibility of exploitation and the parties generally have the same goals), this 
would seem to be an ideal example of a suitable legislative framework.  However, it is also 
easy to see why lawyers have been less than enthusiastic.  The drafting is undeniably loose 
and vague and if one moves beyond the functional family/relationship, it is clear that the 
legislation could allow for exploitation or imposition of the representative’s values and 
goals.  This dissonance emerges from a textual analysis.  However, the more interesting 
question is how the RAA has actually operated in practice.  Surprisingly, there has been 
limited empirical research on this question (James and Watts, 2014) although some work is 
now emerging. 
 James and Watts study (2014) of the lived experience of supported decision-making 
provides important insights into the operations of the RAA in practice.  The Study, which 
was conducted for the Law Commission of Ontario, is relatively small and is described by the 
authors as ‘an initial scoping of the issues’ (2014: 4). In brief, the Study found that 
supported decision-making under the RAA had not been widely adopted and that, insofar as 
RAs were used, it was primarily by people with intellectual/developmental disabilities and 
not by older people or people with other kinds of cognitive impairment such as acquired 
brain-injury (2014: 49-50).  There were few concerns about how RAs were working in 
practice, although examples were given of situations where parties proceeded with an RA 
notwithstanding that the person being supported had very limited understanding of the RA 
or the framework (2014: 50).  The reasons given by respondents for the lack of concern was 
that most people using the legal framework were ‘members of a small community where 
representatives were highly engaged in the lives of the people they were supporting’ (2014: 
50).   Thus, the benefits of supported decision-making are not being experienced by older 
adults notwithstanding the potential of this during the earlier stages of dementia (2014: 52).  
Instead, there is a ‘strong tendency’ to move straight to substitute decision-making for this 
group because this is seen as easier and more convenient (2014: 52).   





4.2 The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 
The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (ADMCA) was signed into law by the 
President of Ireland on 30th December 2015.  However, the substantive elements of the 
ADMCA will not come into effect until at least 2019.  Ireland has come late to the process of 
capacity law reform and, until the ADMCA commences, the applicable legal framework 
remains the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871. Although the ADMCA is part of a series of 
law reforms introduced in order to enable Ireland to ratify the CRPD, it does not comply 
entirely with the interpretation of Art. 12 in GC. No 1 (2014).  Thus, the ADMCA operates on 
the basis of a functional test for capacity (ADMCA, s. 3) and permits substitute decision-
making.  Nonetheless, it advances the CRPD agenda in important respects (Donnelly, 2016; 
Kelly, 2017). First, the test for capacity includes various requirements to provide assistance 
and support to the ‘relevant person’ (RP) before a determination of incapacity may be made 
(ADMCA, s.3). Secondly, substitute decision-making (through the appointment of a Decision-
making Representative (DHR)) may only be used as a last resort where the Court has found 
that the decision-making support frameworks cannot be utilised (ADMCA, s. 37-38).  Thirdly, 
the ADMCA makes provision for the person to appoint his or her own substitute decision-
makers through an Enduring Powers of Attorney (EPA) and, (for healthcare decisions), a 
Designated Healthcare Representative (DHRs) appointed under an Advance Healthcare 
Directive (AHD). Fourthly, decisions are not made on the basis of ‘best interests’ but instead 
all decision-makers and supporters must act in accordance with a set of principles.  These 
include encouraging participation by the RP; giving effect in so far as is practicable, to the 
past and present will and preferences of the RP relevant person; taking into account the 
beliefs and values of the RP, and any other factors which the RP would be likely to consider 
if s/he were able to do so (s. 8). Fifthly, and most significantly for the current discussion, the 
ADMCA establishes two forms of decision-making supports which may be utilised where an 
RP believes that his/her capacity is in question or may shortly be in question. 
4.2.1 Support Frameworks under the ADMCA 
The first support framework in the ADMCA involves the appointment of a decision-making 
assistant/s (DMA) who may be appointed in respect of decision/s relating to personal 
welfare (including healthcare) and/or property and affairs (ADMCA, s. 10).  The RP can 
appoint as many DMAs as s/he chooses and/or appoint different DMAs for different 
decisions (ADMCA, s. 10). The DMA’s role is to assist the RP in obtaining and explaining 
information relevant to the decision; to ascertain the RP’s will and preferences and assist 
the RP in communicating them; to assist the RP in making and expressing a decision; and to 
endeavor to ensure that the RP’s relevant decisions are implemented (ADMCA, s. 14(1)). 
However, the DMA may not make a decision on behalf of the RP (ADMCA, s. 14(2)) and any 
decision made is deemed to be the decision of the RP (ADMCA, s. 14(3)).  
The second, and more extensive, form of support involves a co-decision maker/s 
(CDM) who jointly makes the decisions which are specified in the CDM Agreement with the 
RP (ADMCA, s. 17).The CDM must explain relevant information and considerations to the 
RP; ascertain the RP’s will and preferences and assist the RP with communicating these; 
assist the RP in obtaining relevant information; discuss with the RP the known alternatives 
and likely outcomes of a decision; make a decision jointly with the RP; and, make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the decision is implemented as far as practicable (ADMCA, s. 19(1)).  
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Although decisions are jointly made by the RP and the CDM, the CDM must acquiesce with 
the wishes of the RP and, where the decision requires a document to be signed, the CDM 
may not refuse to sign the document unless it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
acquiescence in the RP’s wishes or signing the document would result in serious harm to the 
RP or another person (ADMCA, s. 19(5)).   
 Unlike the RAA, the same standard for capacity applies to all appointments and 
decisions under the ADMCA.  Thus, in order to appoint a DMA or a CDM, a person must be 
able to understand the nature and consequences of this decision in the context of the 
available choices at the time the appointment is made (ADMCA, s. 3(1)).  A person lacks the 
capacity to do this if s/he is unable to understand the relevant information; to retain that 
information long enough to make a voluntary choice; to use or weigh that information as 
part of the process of making the decision; or to communicate the decision (ADMCA, s. 
3(2)).   
There are limited formalities for the appointment of a DMA.  There is no statutory 
requirement for registration or for a formal assessment of capacity.  However, provision is 
made to set out formalities in secondary legislation (ADMCA, s. 10(4)) which presumably is 
intended to allow some flexibility in adjusting the applicable standards as the area develops.  
The relevant regulations have not been published at the time of writing.  In contrast, the 
process for the appointment of a CDM is very tightly circumscribed. There must be a formal 
assessment of capacity by both a registered medical practitioner and another healthcare 
professional.  These must certify that the RP has capacity to make the decision to enter the 
CDM Agreement; that s/he requires assistance in decision-making in respect of decisions 
covered by the CDM Agreement; and, that s/he has the capacity to make these decisions 
with the assistance of a CDM (ADMCA, s. 21(4)(f)).  As Brendan Kelly points out, this requires 
‘a very subtle assessment of differential mental capacities’ (2017: 355).  There are also 
requirements for statements by the RP that s/he understands the nature of the CDM 
Agreement and wishes to enter it (ADMCA, s. 21(4)(b)). The CDM Agreement must be 
registered with the Director of Decision Support Services (DDSS) (the body charged with 
oversight of the ADMCA (ADMCA, s. 21(1)) and the DDSS must make several substantive 
evaluations before registering the Agreement (ADMCA, s. 22(1)).   There will also be 
obligations to provide notice of the application for registration to various parties (these will 
be set out in secondary legislation (ADMCA, s. 31(c)) and provision is made for objections to 
be made to registration (ADMCA, s. 24).   CDMs must also make annual reports to the DDSS 
(ADMCA, s. 27(1).  
 
4.2.2 ADMCA in Dementia   
Given that the ADMCA has not yet commenced, there is a degree of speculation in 
considering how it will operate in a progressive illness such as dementia. However, some 
points may be made based on the available evidence.  In the first instance, it is difficult to 
predict how many people preparing for dementia will avail themselves of the option to put 
in place supported decision-making arrangements. The Canadian example (not just in British 
Columbia but also in the other relevant jurisdictions) suggests that uptake will be limited at 
least initially (James and Watts, 2014).  It is likely to require substantial efforts in terms of 
public education and awareness, not to mind the development of public trust in the new 
processes, for the Irish experience to be different.  
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Based solely on the text of the ADMCA, several difficulties may be identified. First, 
the ADMCA is highly complex and at times impenetrable, even for experienced lawyers.  
Secondly, there are is uncertainty as regards the boundary between appointing a DMA or 
CDM.  Although the ADMCA seems to presume that a CDM will be more involved in the 
decision-making process, there is no clear legislative statement in this regard and the 
differences between a DMA and a CDM appear ‘chiefly quantitative rather than qualitative’ 
(Kelly, 2017: 355).  In both cases, the decision-making process itself must be centred on the 
applicable principles, which apply identically to DMAs and CDMs, and therefore, in theory it 
should make no difference to the decision made whether the support of a DMA or a CDM is 
utilised.  Yet, the procedural requirements for the two processes are strikingly different.  
Thirdly, there is also uncertainty regarding the boundary when the authority of a 
CDM expires (because the person no longer has capacity to make decisions jointly with the 
CDM) and the authority of a substitute decision-maker (DMR; Attorney; or DHR) is required. 
Again, the applicable decision-making principles are identical and so the practical difference 
in terms of the decision made should, in theory, be minimal.  It is, of course, possible for a 
person to avoid uncertainty by appointing someone to be their CDM and then, when they 
no longer have capacity for this to operate, to be their Attorney under an EPA.  However, 
this requires that two separate and relatively complex processes be employed.  Given that 
the administrative burdens for the creation of a CDM are almost as onerous than those for 
an EPA, a person who is putting a framework in place to deal with impending (or possible) 
dementia and his or her advisors might prefer to use the more long-established EPA option 
instead of the newer CDM option (or a combination of the two).  Having said that, the sheer 
depth and scale of procedural requirements for a CDM may mean that there is greater trust 
in this option in the context of dementia than has been the case with the more relaxed 
framework in British Columbia. Time will tell; however, it is by no means unimaginable that 
the supported decision-making options under the ADMCA will be no more popular for 
people with dementia than those in the RAA. 
Conclusion 
Supported decision-making has a valuable role to play in dementia care; it keeps the person 
with dementia at the centre of decision-making and offers the possibility of preserving past 
identity while recognising current circumstances.  However, as seen here, the task of 
establishing legal frameworks for the delivery of supported decision-making in dementia is 
far from straightforward.  After almost two decades in operation, it would appear that, in 
spite of its success for adults with intellectual/development disabilities, the RAA has not 
delivered a workable framework for people with dementia in British Columbia.  This seems 
to be primarily because it fails to provide the degree of protection and oversight which 
people preparing for dementia and their advisors regard as important.  The textual 
evaluation of the ADMCA suggests that protection and oversight is likely to be less of a 
problem, at least with CDM Agreements.  However, the sheer complexity of the legislation 
and the novelty of the idea of co-decision-making may mean that CDM Agreements will be 
overlooked in favour of the more established Enduring Power of Attorney in situations of 
advance planning for dementia in Ireland. 
It may take several iterations to establish appropriate legal frameworks for 
supported decision-making in dementia.  After all, it is only relatively recently that 
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normative conversations about impaired capacity have begun to emerge from the ‘shadow 
of the Enlightenment-derived fixation on (capacity-based) autonomy’ (Donnelly, 2017: 305).  
The law will take time to catch up.  Yet, this remains an important endeavour in law and 
policy making for dementia care.  For people with dementia, the availability of supported 
decision-making offers a legal choice; a way of maintaining some degree of control for as 
long as possible.  The value of this in the face of a progressive illness like dementia should 
not be underestimated.  More generally, the concept plays an important educative role, 
serving as a reminder that cognitive decline in dementia does not mean an end to moral 
personhood.  
 
Conflicts of interest: none 
Funding: This article is based on a paper delivered at the International Association of Mental 
Health Lawyers in Prague, 2017.  My attendance at the conference was funded by the 
Dean’s Strategic Fund, Law School, University College Cork. 
 
References  
Abberley, P. (1987). The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Model of 
Disability. Disability, Handicap and Society. 2(1), 5-19. 
 
Arstein-Kerslake, A. (2017). Restoring Voice to People with Cognitive Disabilities: Realising 
the Right to Equal Recognition Before the Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ash, E. (2014).  What is Dementia?. In C. Foster, J. Herring and I. Doron (eds). The Law and 
Ethics of Dementia. Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
 
Bach, M. and Kerzner, L. (2010). A New Paradigm for Protecting Legal Autonomy and the 
Right to Legal Capacity: Advancing Substantive Equality for Persons with Disabilities through 
Law, Policy and Practice. Toronto: Law Reform Commission of Ontario. Available at 
https://www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/disabilities-commissioned-paper-
bach-kerzner.pdf.   
 
Baier, A. (1985). Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
 
Baier, A. (1995). Moral Postures: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies and British Columbia Law Institute. (2006).  A 
Comparative Analysis of Adult Guardianship Laws in BC, New Zealand and Ontario.  CCELS 
Report No. 4/BCLI Report No. 46. Vancouver: CCELS/BCLI. 
 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2014). General Comment No. 1 on 
Equal Recognition before the Law. CRPD/C/GC/1. 
 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2018). General Comment No. 1 on 




Dhanda, A. (2006-7).  Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the 
Past or Lodestar for the Future? Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce. 34, 429-
462. 
 
Donnelly, M. (2010). Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the 
Limits of Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 
Donnelly, M. (2016). The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015: Implications for 
Healthcare Decision-Making. Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland. 22(2), 65-77. 
 
Donnelly, M. (2016). Best Interests: Time to Say Goodbye?. Medical Law Review. 24(3) 318-
332. 
 
Donnelly, M. (2017). Changing Values and Growing Expectations: The Evolution of Capacity 
Law.  Current Legal Problems. 70, 305-336. 
 
Doron, I. (2014). The Demographics of Dementia. In C. Foster, J. Herring and I. Doron (eds). 
The Law and Ethics of Dementia. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy. Hastings 
Center Report. 25(6), 32-38. 
 
Dworkin, R. (1993). Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and 
Individual Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Engelhardt, T. (1986). The Foundations of Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Freeman, M.C. et al. (2015).  Reversing Hard Won Victories in the Name of Human Rights: A 
Critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.  The Lancet Psychiatry. 2(9), 844-850. 
 
Gilbar, R. (2011). Family Involvement, Independence and Patient Autonomy in Practice. 
Medical Law Review. 19(2) 192- 234. 
 
Gordon, R. (2000). The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian 
Law of Adult Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making. International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry. 23(1), 61-77. 
 
Gooding, P. (2015). Negotiating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to Legal Capacity in 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to 
Major Concerns. Human Rights Law Review. 15(1), 45-71. 
 
Herring, J. (2009). Losing it? Losing What? The Law and Dementia. Child and Family Law 
Quarterly. 21(1), 3-29. 
 
James, K. and Watts, L. (2014). Understanding the Lived Experiences of Supported Decision-




Jennings, B. (2010). Agency and Moral Relationships in Dementia. In E. Feder Kittay and L. 
Carlson (eds). Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. Chicester: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
 
Kayess, R. and French, P. (2008). Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Human Rights Law Review. 8(1), 1-34. 
 
Kelly, B.  (2017). The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015: What it is and why it 
matters. Irish Journal of Medical Science. 186(2), 351-356. 
 
Kittay, E. (1999). Love’s Labour: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Lindemann, H. (2010). Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) in a Time of 
Dementia. In E. Feder Kittay and L. Carlson (eds). Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to 
Moral Philosophy. Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Lindemann Nelson, J. (2010). Alzheimer’s Disease and Socially Extended Mentation. In E. 
Feder Kittay and L. Carlson (eds). Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. 
Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
MacKenzie, C and Stoljar, N. (2000). Relational Autonomy: Relational Perspectives on 
Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Martin. W. et al. (2014). Achieving CRPD Compliance. Essex Autonomy Project.  Available at 
https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/EAP-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf   
 
Nedelsky, J. (1989). Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities. Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism. 1(1), 7-36. 
 
Nedelsky, J. (2011). Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nunnelly, S. (2015). Personal Support Networks in Practice and Theory: Assessing the 
Implications for Supported Decision-Making Law. Ontario: Law Commission of Ontario. 
 
Oliver, M. (1990). The Politics of Disablement. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Oliver, M. (2009). Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice. 2nd Ed. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Quinn, G. with Rekas-Rosalbo, A. (2016) Civil Death: Rethinking the Foundations of  
Legal Personhood for Persons with a Disability. Irish Jurist. 56, 286-325. 
 





Series, L. (2016). Relationship, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and Support 
Paradigms. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 40, 80-91. 
 
Shakespeare, T.  (2006). Disability Rights and Wrongs. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Shakespeare, T. (2013).  Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Terzi, L. (2004). The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique. Journal of Applied 
Philosophy. 21(2), 141-157. 
 
United Nations. (2006). Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. A/RES/61/106 
Annex 1. 
 
Veatch,  R. (1981). A Theory of Medical Ethics. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Ward, A. (2014). Abolition of all Guardianship and Mental Health Laws. Elder Law Journal.  
4(1), 71-75. 
 
Yon, Y., Mikton, C.R., Gassoumis, Z.D., Wilber, K.H. (2017).  Elder Abuse Prevalence in 
Community Settings: A Systematic Review and Meta Analysis. Lancet Global Health. 2017 
Feb;5(2):e147-e156 
